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The most preoccupying problem of the European Free Trade As-
sociation (EFTA) as it approaches its ninth birthday is, oddly enough, 
that it still exists. Formed in 1960 by the so-called Outer Seven coun-
tries, which for one reason or another were unwilling or unable to sub-
scribe to the Treaty of Rome, it was viewed from the beginning not as 
a vehicle to unify all or part of Western Europe but as a way station, a 
temporary base from which more permanent economic arrangements 
among all the former OEEC I countries, Six and Seven alike, could be 
created. 
Events, however, would not have it so. Not only did the solution 
initially preferred by EFTA countries-a broad, negotiated settlement 
in which the Common Market as well as EFTA would make some con-
cessions-prove unattainable, but also the humbler approach whereby 
individual EFTA members sought to make their own arrangements with 
the European Economic Community (EEC) largely on its terms, has come 
to nought. (EFTA's most recent proposals to "build bridges" between 
itself and the EEC was made, largely at British initiative, in 1965. The 
EEC made no reply.) Of the seven (in effect eight, if Finland, which is 
technically an associate member, is counted) EFTA members, three-
the United Kingdom, Denmark and Norway-have applied for EEC mem-
bership; Sweden has asked for negotiations leading to either full or as-
sociate membership; Austria and Switzerland have requested associate 
member ship; and Portugal has requested negotiations leading to unde-
fined arrangements. Since the negotiations for British entry were broken 
off by France's veto in January 1963, all but one of these applications, 
including the renewed British and Swedish versions, have lain dormant 
in the EEC' s in-box. The exception is Austria, which alone among EFTA 
members shows a willingness to proceed with its application-and, if 
necessary, to drop EFTA for EEC-irrespective of what happens to the 
British application. While Austria's negotiations with the EEC have at 
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British application. While Austria's negotiations with the EEC have at 
least gotten under way, they have, nevertheless, slowed to a virtual 
stalemate as a result of both technical and political obstacles to an 
agreement. So willy-nilly, for better or worse, EFTA has had to recon-
cile itself to unanticipated longevity. 
When this first became clear, through General de Gaulle's 
initial veto in 1963, EFTA reacted by strengthening the intensity and 
pace of its own internal development. The schedule for the elimination 
of tariffs and quotas was compressed and the new target date of Dec-
ember 31, 1966-three years earlier than the deadline s pee ified in the 
Stockholm Convention-was set for the achievement of free trade in 
industrial goods among members. With only a few minor exceptions, 
this goal was attained. As the EEC was simultaneously accelerating 
its own program-its customs union was completed, again with only 
minor exceptions, on July 31, 1968-the economic division of Western 
Europe, which EFTA countries had been concerned to prevent, became 
a fact. 
The effects of this division on trading patterns are not so dra-
matic as might be supposed; the ordinary consumer can easily spot so 
many anomalies that he might well wonder whether the groupings have 
any significance at all. Geneva housewives, for example, go next door 
to French Savoy to buy Austrian butter, which is cheaper and better 
than what is available at home. Meanwhile, Savoyard housewives can 
buy the same quality Italian peaches in Geneva more cheaply than at 
home. Norwegians pay the same import duty on cars coming from 
Britain or Sweden as on those coming from EEC sources. The same 
Philips (a company which is Dutch-based) tape recorder sells for half 
again as much in Belgium as in Switzerland. Each of these curiosities 
can be explained, of course, although the explanations are less obvious 
in some cases than in others. Taken together they demonstrate that 
so many factors in addition to import duties influence the final selling 
price of an item that trade groupings, whose preferential features con-
sist mainly in the differential application of those duties, frequently do 
not bestow a telling competitive advantage on their intended beneficiaries. 
On the level of macroeconomic analysis, the effects of the divi-
sion are perceptible but not startling. On the one hand, the proportions 
of EFTA countries' imports coming from, and of their exports going to, 
the EEC grew slightly from 1959 to 1966: from 28.1 per cent to 31.2 
per cent for imports, and from 23.4 per cent to 25.6 per cent for ex-
ports. EFTA exports to the EEC, moreover, grew faster during the 
period of separate integration ( 1959-1966) than during the preceding 
period ( 1953-1959). This can be attributed, however, to the faster 
growth of import demand in the EEC during the later period. 
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On the other hand, EFTA' s part of total EEC imports and exports 
did diminish, especially the former: whereas 17 .3 per cent of Common 
Market imports in 1959 came from EFTA countries, this figure dropped 
to 14.3 per cent by 1966. The Common Market's external tariff was, it 
seems, making itself felt. Correspondingly, EFTA's composite trade 
balance with the EEC worsened; a deficit which measured $1.68 billion 
in 1959 grew to $3.42 billion by 1966. And in the case of both groups, 
internal trade showed a propensity to grow faster than trade between 
the two groups or with third countries. 2 It is improbable, however, 
that these trends result entirely from the existence of the two trade 
blocs. A recent study by the EFTA Secretariat estimates that only 
25 per cent of the increase in trade among member countries of EFTA 
from 1959 to 1965 can be directly attributed to the creation of EFTA. 3 
These effects have been far from evenly distributed among 
EFTA's members. Of the $1.7 billion increase in EFTA's trade deficit 
with the EEC, about $1.35 billion or 80 per cent was accounted for by 
three small countries: Switzer land, Austria and Denmark. Not sur-
prisingly, this fact, coupled with certain of their national features, has 
a great deal to do with their attitudes toward EFTA. In the case of 
Switzerland, for example, the worsened trade balance stems more from 
a total increase in imports than from EEC discrimination; Swiss exports 
diminished only marginally. All the same, the existence of EFTA had 
a net beneficial effect on the Swiss balance of payments which was wel-
come at a time when the over-all trade balance was worsening. The 
study by the EFTA Secretariat shows that the positive effect of EFTA 
for Switzerland's trade balance is greater, in proportion to the size of 
the country, than for any other member. It is entirely appropriate, 
therefore, for the Swiss to be quite happy, as they are, with their EFTA 
membership and unconcerned about the effects of Europe's economic 
split. As they never desired nor expected European political unifica-
tion, EFTA's lack of such goals is regarded by the Swiss as congenial 
and realistic. One only wonders whether, if they had known in 1959 
how little the Common Market would affect their exports to the Six, 
they would have bothered to join EFTA. 
Austria and Denmark, on the other hand, have suffered from 
Common Market discrimination; accordingly, a note of urgency infuses 
their efforts to come to terms with Europe's division into economic 
blocs. We have already noted Austria's efforts to negotiate with the 
EEC independently of Britain. In Denmark, too, there has been domestic 
political pressure-mainly from the Agrarian party, which sees the 
Common Agricultural Policy of the Six as paradise on earth-in favor 
of an "Alleingang," although the government has not adopted this policy. 
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And since agreements with the EEC have not been possible for either 
country anyway, each has naturally sought to make the most of EFTA 's 
potential for relieving its difficulties. 
For industrial products, this effort has paid off in both cases. 
Austria enjoyed an estimated $29 million net advantage in its 1965 bal-
ance of trade as a result of EFTA 's existence.4 But while the existence 
of the EFTA alternative clearly helped, the magnitude of the country's 
initial dependence on EEC markets (in 1958, 49.6 per cent of its exports 
went to EEC countries, 10.5 per cent to EFTA countries; in 1966, the 
corresponding figures were 44.6 per cent and 20.l per cent meant that 
such a solution could only be partial. For Denmark, EFTA has had no 
appreciable effect on the trade balance. Given the relative importance 
of agricultural products in Danish exports, the increased possibilities 
offered by EFTA for industrial products have not been sufficiently im-
portant to offset the harmful effect of the EEC' s Common Agricultural 
Policy on Danish food exports. 5 The Danish government's (socialist 
and non-socialist alike) reaction has been to press for greater liberal-
ization of agricultural trade within EFTA. The Stockholm Convention's 
provisions for the abolition of trade restrictions, however, do not apply 
to agricultural products, but it does authorize and encourage bilateral 
agreements among member countries to deal with this problem. A 
number of such agreements have in fact been concluded, the most im-
portant of which gives assured access for some Danish products, notably 
bacon, to the British market. But these agreements have not sufficed 
to meet Denmark's expectations, and efforts to make them more satis-
factory continually founder on the countries I agricultural protectionism 
in general, and on the specifically Swedish policy of remaining 80 per 
cent self- sufficient in food in order to make plausible its political 
neutrality. 
,,, 
,,, 
General de Gaulle's first veto of British entry to the EEC in 
1963, as noted previously, prompted EFTA to intensify its own work 
program. When the veto was exercised again in November 1967, the 
same reflex operated. In the meantime, however, the guts of EFTA's 
program-the elimination of tariffs and quotas on intra-area trade in 
industrial products-had been realized. It was, therefore, less obvious 
on this occasion what was entailed by the EFTA ministers' renewed 
determination that, "so long as the establishment of a single European 
market remained out of reach, their co-operation in EFTA should be 
actively pursued." 6 There is no question of changing the basic rules 
of the game in order to include agriculture under the free trade rules-
-5 - JM-1-'69 
however much the Danes might fancy the idea-or in order to create 
a customs union, let alone an economic union. Short of that, the proper 
area of activity is clear enough; but it is not so clear what the outcome 
of that activity should be. Such ambiguity lends itself to varying appre-
ciations based on different national interests and judgments, and rr1uch 
of the current internal politics of EFTA revolves around this problen1.. 
The pertinent area here is that of indirect trade barriers; that 
is, of obstacles other than tariffs and quotas. These barriers include 
such things a.s differences in applicable health and safety regulations 
from one country to another, different kinds and levels of taxation, and 
different technical standards. They are notoriously nun1erous, varied, 
and effective in inhibiting or distorting trade, although their effect may 
only become apparent when highly protective direct barriers--tariffs 
and quotas--are dismantled. 
The Stockholm Convention refers to these barriers, covered by 
Articles 13-17, as 11the rules of competition. 11 The articles deal with 
most, though not all, of the practices likely to distort competition in a 
free trade area: govern1nent aids to local industry, including rebates 
to exporters for indirect taxes; national discrimination in public pro-
curement by government agencies; restrictive business practices by 
privc1te or public enterprises; infringements of the right of establish-
ment of nationals of other EFTA countries; and dumping and the sub-
sidizing of exports. Son1e other rneasures, such as revenue duties, 
charges assessed for technical reasons when goods cross borders, and 
11 drawback 11 --i.e., the refund to exporters of duties paid by them on 
i1nµorted matcrials--are dealt with elsewhere in the Convention. 
EFTA prides itself as an organization on its pragmatism and 
flexibility. One principle in its pragmatic creed is that it does not 
seek to harmonize the policies of its members-- 11 harrnonization, 11 
\vhich is music to the ears of a Brussels functionary, is a bad word 111 
Gencva--but only to insure that differences among those policies do 
not hamper the operation of the free trade area. 7 The application of 
this principle to the case of indirect trade barriers takes the form of 
the "frustration clause, 11 which is the key phrase in all but one of the 
rules of competition. It states that 1neasures under those categories 
are prohibited if they "frustrate the benefits expected from the removal 
or absence of duties and quantitative restrictions on trade bet\.veen 
Member Statcs. 11 
The problem arises, of course, precisely because there is no 
objective or agreed understanding of what this clause means in practice. 
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The EFTA Council was instructed in the 1963 work program to review 
these provisions in order to reach an agreed interpretation. No sooner 
had this process been completed, in 1968 (the understandings remaining 
far fron1 precise), than the new work program directed a second revie\.v 
to be rnade. This is now under way. 
Some progress has been made both in laying down general guide 
lines, as, for example, the instructions to public procurement agencies 
that they must treat EFTA suppliers on equal terms with national firms, 
and in dealing with specific complaints of infringement of the rules as 
they arise. For the most part, these settlernents have been made in an 
informal way, frequently between the t\vo countries directly involved, 
rather than by recourse to the formal procedures for the resolution of 
disputes laid down in the Convention. It is also true that most complaints 
have been handled in a spirit of compromise and reasonableness. But 
it is going too far to say, as comn1entators dismayed with the EEC 's 
acknowledged lack of progress sometimes do, that EFTA has achieved 
substantially more in this area than have the Six. 
The difficulty is not so much that governments are obstinately 
protectionist as that they have different interests and objectives tlut 
get in the way of efforts to apply the rules of competition even-handedly. 
The British and Swedish governments, for example, and perhaps others 
as well, use government spending, in part, as an instrument of anti-
cyclical policy and of regional development; they are thus reluctant to 
agree, even in principle, to do away with all discrimination against 
EFTA suppliers in public procurement. Sweden, on the other hand, 1s 
keen to eliminate the import duties legally retained by some EFTA 
members, for revenue purposes, on car imports. Such duties do not 
discriminate against Swedish cars, for they are applied equally to all 
car imports, and the countries in question-such as Switzerland and 
Norway-have no domestic car industries, but they do deny the Swedes 
the competitive advantage they \vould otherwise enjoy over, say, German 
cars. To change this policy the countries involved would have to alter 
their own tax systems in order to find alternative sources of revenue, 
and this is not something that is done willingly. A further example is 
that Norway is reluctant to agree to a liberal interpretation of the pro-
visions on establishment, for fear that the bulk of its industry would 
quickly pass under foreign control. 
It is not clear how much these obstacles actually interfere with 
intra-EFTA trade at present, for there have been very few complaints. 
Perhaps this is to be explained by the vagueness of the frustration 
clause, which leaves traders uncertain of their rights under the Convention. 
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On the other hand, it is also plausible that if there were many signifi-
cant instances of distortion of competition, the businessmen affected 
would not hesitate to make known their grievances. At any rate, only 
a low head of stea1n has built up so far behind the efforts to eliminate 
the re1naining barriers. Only the United Kingdom has made a precise 
proµosal for clarifying the rules of competition, and it is a narrower 
interpretation than that favored by most of the other members. (The 
gist of the proposal is that only those policies equivalent, in effect, to 
a duty should be prohibited under the rules of competition.) 
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In this instance as in many others1 the British are viewed by 
other members-especially the Nordic countries-as being for EFTA 
what the French are for the Common Market: the bad boys, the heel 
dragger s. After all, it was the United Kingdom which provoked E:FT A' s 
only internal crisis to date, ·when it imposed a surcharge on imports in 
1964. While the 1968 counterpart of that action-the import deposit 
scheme-got a sornewhat more sympathetic reaction frorn other EFTA 
countries, to the pleasant surprise of the British, it is not the only cur-
rent subject of friction between the United Kingdom and its partners. 
Norway has objected to the British government's policy of encouraging 
the construction of aluminum smelters in Britain, which will compete 
directly with the smelting industry that Norway has recently built up 
with the benefit of its cheap hydroelectric power. Norway again, and 
to a lesser extent Denmark, was also penalized when Britain recently 
reintroduced a tariff-at the level of 10 per cent-on frozen fish fillets, 
which those countries have been exporting in rapidly growing volume. 
(Fortunately, the import deposit scheme is applicable neither to fish 
fillets nor to aluminum.) In both instances, the British case is built 
on fairly defensible arguments, but that does not alter the sensitivity, 
growing out of the marked disparity in size, that small countries show 
toward actions that for Britain are relatively minor. In this respect, 
the British role in EFTA has perhaps more in common with the Ameri-
can role in NATO or the OECD than with the French position in the 
Common Market. 
Finally, the British are rightly suspected to be somewhat re-
luctant, even while endorsing it in principle, to proceed on Iceland's 
application for membership in the association. The application raises 
two problems: how to accommodate Iceland I s only major export, fish, 
when a glutted market is already pressing downward incomes of British 
fishermen; and the pros pee t that Iceland's vote will give the Nordic coun-
tries (Finland included) a five-to-four majority in the organization. This 
consideration is not unimportant, notwithstanding EFTA's lack of politi-
cal pretentions, as it does sometimes take decisions by majority vote. 
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Underlying these specific disputes, there is a basic divergence 
of outlook between the British, on the one hand, <ind the Scandinavians 
(among whom the differences are more nuanced) on the other. The 
forrncr, having endorsed not only the commercial aims but also what 
the French call the "political ideology" of the EEC, are impatient to 
wind up EFTA and get on with the job of "building Europe." The Lttter, 
ho\vever 1nuch they \Voulcl like to get rid of the economic inconveniences 
brought about by the F:FTA-EEC split, do not share these political ob-
jectives. They are, therefore, less unhappy about EFTA 1 s stubborn 
longevity and are in favor of, and not merely unopposed to, strengthen-
ing the organization. It has, after all, had substantial benefits: its rela-
tively non-political character has made it possible to accommodate 
Finland in a Y./cstern economic framework without provoking sharp 
Russian reactions and the S\vedes got the free access to Danish and 
Norwegian n1c..trkets that they had sought earlier, unsuccessfully, in an 
exclusively Nordic grouping. True, the Scandinavians find it somewhat 
of a political embarrassment to belong to a 11 clubby 11 sort of organiza-
tion of which Portugal is a men1ber, but that is only a n1odest liability. 
The idea of a closer economic co-operation on a Nordic basis, 
which has recurred periodically every few years since World War II, 
is current again. A working party of the four countries (Iceland is not 
included) has prepared draft proposals for the creation of a Nordic 
Economic Union. The aim is not to fragment Europe even further nor 
to derogate from EFTA but to intensify co-operation within the more 
limited grouping and to strengthen the possibility that the free trade 
and the ties to Finland alrec1dy achieved will be secure whatever happens 
to EFTA. There is also a desire to achieve greater bargaining power 
in approaching the EF:C. Already during the Kennedy Round, the Nordic 
countries formed a single negotiating team for the later stages (EFTA 
as a whole consulted closely on the negotiations, but did not negotiate 
as a unit, as did the EEC), with results that were quite satisfactory for 
them. It remains to be seen whether the present efforts will succeed 
in reconciling such special interests as Danish agriculture and Nor-
wegian fears of Swedish industrial dominance, on which the earlier 
integration schemes foundered. 
Since fulfillment, for EFTA, is not an internal thing, it keeps 
its antenna alert to suggestions from any source for wider economic 
arrangements. The idea of a North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA) 
is followed; but, since it is judged a non-starter for political reasons, 
it generates little excitement. EFTA remains ready, moreover, to 
consider proposals that the EEC may eventually decide to make for 
commercial arrangements between the two groups. (Having itself made 
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the last formal proposals of this kind, which went unanswered, EFTA 
shows no inclination to take any new initiatives.) There is little enthusi-
asm for the recent French and German proposals for commercial arrange-
ments, however, as they promise a lot of political trouble (antagonizing 
the Americans, violating the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) 
1n return for very modest tariff adjustments. 
In its nine or so years, EFTA has shown itself to be viable: it 
has demonstrated the workability of an industrial free trade area, based 
on a declaration-of-origin system. This accomplishment alone is worth 
while for, during the OEEC 's free trade negotiations a decade ago, there 
was some doubt whether regional free trade without a common external 
tariff could be operated. Moreover, it has improved the trade balance 
of each of its members and one country, Denmark, has bettered the over-
all annual balance of the eight countries by almost half a billion dollars . 8 
It has outlived the disfavor of the United States State Department, al-
though whether this is testimony to its own achievements or a result 
of disillusionment with the EEC is unclear. And it now seems to be 
regarded as more than a 1'poor relative 1'; in addition to the Icelandic 
application, the Yugoslavs are negotiating for some kind of association. 
This does not quite equal the long queue of suitors who wait, some of 
them with seemingly endless patience, in Brussels. But it is something. 
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